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TAXING CORPORATE BONUSES AND "GIFTS"
HERMAN T. REILING *
INTRODUCTION
The topic of this paper is one of the narrowest but most fascinat-
ing issues within the ambit of federal income taxation. I shall discuss
the treatment for income tax purposes of payments by a corporation
to an officer or employee, or to the widow or dependent of such officer
or employee. The payment in question is voluntary in the sense that
it is not made in pursuance of an expressed or implied contract between
the corporation and the recipient.
The primary income tax issue to the recipient is whether the
payment constitutes a gift within the meaning of the section of the
Internal Revenue Code which excludes gifts from taxable income.'
To the corporation, the question is whether the payment constitutes an
ordinary and necessary business expense, deductible as such by the
corporation from its income in computing its taxable income.' The
payment will not qualify as a deductible expense if it falls into one
of the following three categories: a true gift; a capital expenditure,
i.e., an outlay for good will; or a distribution of a dividend or assets
to a recipient who is a stockholder.
A study of the cases reveals two fact situations which typically
raise the problem of the classification for tax purposes of voluntary
* LL.B., University of Chicago Law School; member, Illinois Bar; Chairman, Chief
Counsel Policy and Research Committee, Internal Revenue Service; listed in "Who's
Who in The South and Southwest, 1963-1964." The author emphasizes that this discussion
represents his own personal views and is not to be interpreted in any sense as the official
opinion of the Treasury Department or any unit thereof.
1
 All citations are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
Int. Rev. Code, § 102. This exemption, though contained in the invalid income taxing act
of 1894, originated in the Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16 § nr, 38 Stat. 166 (1913), and has
been continuously in effect for all subsequent years.
2
 Int. Rev. Code, § 162. A similar provision was included in the corporation excise
taxing act of 1909, ch. 6 § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909), which measured the tax by net income
and has been in effect for all years of general income taxation.
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payments by corporations. In the first instance, the corporation makes
a voluntary payment to an officer or an employee, or to a retiring
officer or employee. The resolution authorizing the payment is in
words, perhaps sometimes in weasel words, which technically permit
the recipient to maintain that the payment is a gratuity or gift, in
which case the corporation may or may not claim a deduction. Often,
the relationship of the recipient to the corporation—for example,
where the payment is to one who is also a dominant stockholder or
where the payment is made to officers in proportion to their stock-
holdings—will control the issues involved in a particular case.
In the second situation, either upon the death of an officer or
employee, but, more frequently, upon the death of an officer, the cor-
poration votes to pay the widow a lump-sum or to make certain
periodic payments to her, such as, an amount equal to the monthly
salary of her husband for a specified period. Here, too, there may be
varying circumstances that preclude the application of one rule in all
cases.
In a broader sense, I propose to do more than discuss the issues
raised in these cases, and will study the problems in the light of the
relation of the law of income taxation to private law, particularly
commercial law. It is well to point out that the law involved in income
taxation is not separate and distinct from other fields. Income taxation
is parasitical; it depends for its facts upon private law, and, in cases
such as these, involving the rights and relations of corporations to
their stockholders and to other persons, particularly upon commercial
law.
More specifically, the relation of commercial law to this discus-
sion may be briefly explained in this way. The law of the state in
which a corporation is formed .is controlling in construing the cor-
porate powers. In addition, the rights of a business corporation and
its relations to others are determined by the applicable state law. True,
if in a special case applicable state law differs from the law that gen-
erally prevails throughout the states, a given organization' or trans-
action4 may be classified for income tax purposes according to the law
that applies more generally among the states. This is essential in
federal taxation, in order. to meet the constitutional requirement of
nationwide uniformity.'
3 See Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925), holding an organiza-
tion to be an association taxable as a corporation, though by the applicable state law it
constituted a partnership.
4
 See Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), holding a transaction to be an oil
and gas lease, though under the law of the state it was regarded as a present sale of the
oil and gas in place.
15
 In what I have said, it is implicit that, contrary to popular assumption, the
functions of the tax lawyer and the commercial lawyer or general practitioner may
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EMPLOYEE'S PENSIONS: A DEFINITION
To trace the growth and the confusion that has ensued in the
treatment of voluntary payments by a corporation to officers, em-
ployees, and others, we need to go back to the beginning, to the corpo-
ration excise taxing act of 1909, which, though imposing an excise
tax on doing business in corporate form, measured the tax by net
income.° At that time, the United States was a predominantly rural
nation. In the main, its laws reflected the lives of rural men. In other
words, Government had not yet developed the social and economic
goals of today, nor had business adopted its present attitude toward
its employees.
When men spoke of a corporation paying an employee a pension,
the word "pension" suggested a matter of grace and not of right.?
"Pension" and "compensation" were not regarded as being synon-
ymous terms.° "Pension" ordinarily suggests the idea of a bounty °
or of a reward for service rendered, but it may include a grant which
is a mere gratuity." In fact, even today the dictionary definition
indicates that the primary attribute of a pension is that it is paid as
a subsidy or a gratuity.
Thus, when we see that the Government first took the position'
under the corporation excise tax act of 1909 that pensions paid or
gifts made by a corporation to employees are gratuities and not
ordinary and necessary expenses deductible by the corporation, we
should not be greatly disturbed. Given both the meaning of that
statute, and a 1910 Government ruling in which the words "pensions"
and "gifts" were similarly classified as gratuities, it is clear that to the
tax authorities, a pension was a gift and not a deductible business
expense.
A year later, however, this definition no longer prevailed. In a
ruling promulgated in 1911, the word "pension" was used in contra-
distinction to "gifts or gratuities."
overlap. This being so, it is in a sense unfortunate that tax specialists have pre-empted
such a large place in the practice and administration of the tax laws. The lawyers who
specialize in federal income tax law, although their contributions have been notable indeed,
constitute the world's largest tax bar; for our guidance they have developed the world's
largest body of judicial opinion respecting income taxation. Even so, there are signs of
inevitable change. Though it is quite unlikely that the need for tax specialists will
disappear in the foreseeable future, the non-tax lawyer is becoming increasingly more
anxious to acquire expertise in the tax field, for fear of unwittingly creating tax problems
that his clients would perhaps not otherwise have.
G Ch. 6 § 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909).
7
 Gleason v. Board of Comm'rs, 92 Kan. 632, 635, 141 Pac. 584, 585 (1914).
8
 This definition of "pension" may still be found today. See DeWitt v. Richmond
County, 192 Ga. 770, 16 S.E.2d 579 (1941).
9
 Frisbe v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895).
10 In re Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 511, 192 Atl. 494 (1937).
11 T.D. 1606, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 39 (1910).
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Amounts paid for pensions to retired employees, or to
their families or others dependent upon them . . . are proper
deductions as "ordinary and necessary expenses"; gifts or
gratuities to employees in the service of a corporation are
not properly deductible in ascertaining net income.°
The rule as thus stated was carried forward and included in the
regulations13
 under the Revenue Act of 1913, which act was the begin-
ning of our present general income tax system. Since the Act of 1913
was a general income taxing act, taxing individuals as well as corpora-
tions but expressly exempting gifts from the tax, the effect of this
definition of a pension was not only to ,deny a deduction to the cor-
poration, but also to relieve the recipient of a tax upon all amounts
that were determined to be gifts.
This rule is a valid one, providing, however, that it is clearly
established that the payment in question is really a gift. For reasons
which shall be explained below, this writer seriously questions whether
any business corporation may make a valid gift.
There is, however, no particular need to pursue this issue as it
relates to pensions. The pensions now paid by business corporations
are, as a general rule, paid pursuant to established retirement and
annuity plans. These plans are a part of the regular plan of hiring
and paying the employees. The employer's contributions to the pension
are deductible and the benefits received by the employees on account
of the employer's contribution are taxable to the employees.
INCOMPETENCY OF CORPORATION TO MAKE A GIFT
From the beginning, the corporation's legal competency to make
a gift has been ignored in income tax litigation. More clearly, the issue
of incompetency has rarely been raised; hence, there have been few
occasions on which the courts have been called upon to decide whether
an incompetent may have an intent to make a gift. In an early case"
before the United States Board of Tax Appeals, in which the Board
held that there was a gift by a corporation to its vice president and
general manager, the Board stated that the essential elements of a
gift are an intention to give, a transfer of title or delivery, and an
acceptance by the donee. Note that the Board did not mention the
12
 T.D. 1742, 14 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 123, 128-29 (1911). See T.D. 1675, 14 Treas.
Dec. Int. Rev. 16 (1911) for a similar holding.
13
 Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 120 (1913).
14 Appeal of Estate of David R. Daly, 3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926). But see Well v.
Commissioner, 31 E.T.A. 899, infra note 15, in which the Board stated that competency
of the donor is one prerequisite. In the majority of cases, however, the issue of donative
competency has not been discussed. See Appeal of E. B. Touser, 1 B.T.A. 1164 (1925);
Appeal of John H. Parrott, 1 B.TA. 1 (1924).
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first prerequisite of a gift, namely, the competency of the alleged
donor to make a gift.
Clearly, for there to be a gift, the donor must be competent to
make one 1 6
 But in the absence of statutory or charter authority to give
away its assets, it is the thesis of this paper that a business corpora-
tion is incompetent to make a gift.
Though theoretically a state may, by statute, allow a business
corporation to make gifts, as a practical matter it is not feasible to so
permit, for such authority would impair the credit of the corporation.
Money could not safely be lent to a corporation, nor could investors
afford to contribute capital to it, unless the corporation agreed not to
give away its assets.
This argument was apparently recognized when the modern busi-
ness corporation laws were adopted. Even the New York Business
Corporation Law as enacted in 1961, effective April 1, 1963, which
goes perhaps as far as that of any other state toward allowing a
corporation to do what an individual may do, does not expressly
permit gifts other than for charitable purposes. It provides that each
business corporation shall have power "in furtherance of its pur-
poses"—
(12) To make donations, irrespective of corporate ben-
efit, for the public welfare or for community fund, hospital,
charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes,
and in time of war or other national emergency in aid
thereof.N (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, by statute, this power is to be exercised only in furtherance
of the corporate purpose. The following example will illustrate the
significance of this limitation. A corporation engaged in a retail busi-
ness in Watertown, New York, could properly contribute to the com-
munity chest of that city, but the New York statute clearly does not
permit a lawful contribution to be made by that corporation to the
community chest of Walla Walla, Washington. In short, there are
two limitations in this statute. The act seemingly goes no further than
to permit a charitable contribution which is made for a good business
reason (the kind of a charitable contribution which has been held to
be a deductible business expense), and which, except for a statutory
16 Well v. Commissioner, supra note 14; 38 C.J.S. Gifts $ 13 (1943).
16 N.Y. Business Corp. Law $ 202.
Statutes expressly authorizing a business corporation to make donations to charity
have been enacted in more than thirty states, including, among others, Illinois, California,
Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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limitation,17 would be deductible in full in computing the corporation's
taxable income.
Since a business corporation may lawfully devote its efforts only
to furthering its business purpose, i.e., the transaction of business for
a pecuniary profit, it is implicit in the nature of a gift that the giving
away of corporate property would not further the corporate business
purpose. This is because a gift is commonly defined, even in federal
tax cases, as a voluntary transfer of property without any considera-
tion or compensation therefor? This concept of a gift has been
inherited from the common law? As a practical matter the general
rule may be thus stated: "[A] gift of property by a. corporation not
created for charitable purposes is in violation of the rights of its
stockholders and is ultra vires, however worthy of encouragement or
aid the object of the gift may be." 2°
State cases show that there may be some question whether a
corporate resolution to make a gift is void or voidable. Whichever it
may be, however, the decisions are clear that where the corporation
has no statutory or charter authority to make a gift, the corporation
may not be compelled to complete the gift. Moreover, if it is com-
pleted, a dissenting stockholder or a creditor whose rights have been
impaired may redress the wrong committed against him.
In addition, in income tax cases in which the recipient of a cor-
porate payment makes a convincing showing of a corporate intent to
make a gift—upon which argument recipients often try to prevail—
the distinction between void and voidable, may be insignificant. This
is especially true if there is no statutory authority for the corporation
to make a gift, or if the corporate charter is in evidence to show no
power in the corporation to make a gift. In fact, an attempt to estab-
lish a corporate intent to make a gift is to contradict the sound view
that corporation action is presumed regular until shown to be other-
wise. The making of a gift by a business corporation would be irregular
if the corporation were shown to have neither statutory nor charter
power to make one. Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that, in exempt-
ing gifts, the Congress meant true gifts in the generally accepted sense
of that word, not payments by a "donor" with no legal power to give.
Of course, if all the stockholders consent and if it is not detri-
17 hit. Rev. Code, § 162(b).
18
 Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1942), Commissioner
v. Montague, 126 F.2d 948, 951 (6th Cir. 1942); Botchford v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 914
(9th Cir. 1936); Noel v. Parrott, 15 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1926).
18
 Long before the inception of the present income tax system a gift had been
defined as a voluntary conveyance of land or other property, from one person to another,
made gratuitously, and not upon any consideration of blood or money. 2 Blackstone
(Lewis), Commentaries 440 (1902 ed.).
20
 6A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 667-68, 1 2939 (1950 ed.).
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mental to creditors, even the corporate officers may appropriate
corporate assets.' In other words, an appropriation of corporate
assets may be made where the stockholders and the creditors do not
object.22
 But it does not follow that the appropriation of corporate
assets is a gift. "Any power sought to be exercised as incidental or
auxiliary must be one which is within the scope and purview of the
corporate objects and purposes as expressed in the charter.' (Em-
phasis supplied.)
Thus, stockholders may approve and creditors may assent and
thereby lose their right of redress in court. But this approval does not
change the character of the transaction. It does not bestow upon the
corporation a power to make gifts where the corporation does not
have such power by statute or under its charter. In short, ratification
of an alleged gift does not cure its illegality; it constitutes nothing. 24
The Supreme Court has pointed out that if the payment constitutes
an illegal gift of corporate funds and amounts to waste, the fact that
the contract was ratified by the stockholders does not cure its ille-
gality. 25
EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
A. Corporate Charter
The difficulty in finding a tax case in which the court has con-
sidered the corporation's lack of power to make a gift is apparently
due to the lack of record evidence on the issue of the absence of such
power in the corporation. Although, as previously noted, the general
rule is that business corporations are not given authority by statute
or by charter to make gifts other than to certain described charities.
Nevertheless if the certificate of incorporation with its charter powers
is not adduced as evidence, it would seem that the court may not
properly presume that the corporation has no power to make a gift.
In the leading case on this point the court said:
The bill does not set out a copy of the certificate of
incorporation with its charter powers, nor are they otherwise
stated in the bill.
The allegation that certain acts are ultra vires is there-
21 Sayre Land Co. v. Borough of Sayre, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 294, 121 A.2d 579 (1956).
22 Gilbert Mfg. Co. v. Goldfine, 317 Mass. 681, 59 N.E.2d 461 (1945); Southern
Hide Co. v. Best, 174 La. 748, 141 So. 449 (1932).
23
 Premium Point Co. v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 36 N.Y.S.2d 829, 832
(Westchester County Ct. 1942). See The Robin Goodfellow, 20 F.2d 924 (W.D. Wash.
1927); Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1916).
24 Kerbs v. California E. Airways, 33 Del. Ch. 174, 91 A.2d 62 (1952).
25 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
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fore the statement of a conclusion, and not a proper plead-
ing of facts.
* * * * * * * *
If, in fact, there is no provision in the charter which
authorizes the majority stockholders to pay out corporate
funds without consideration, then we are of opinion that the
bill does have equity. 2° (Emphasis supplied.)
B. Stockholder Approval
The income tax decisions also show that approval by the stock-
holders is at times apparently considered evidence of an intent to
make a gift. That is of course not so. If the state statute does not
grant the corporation the power to make gifts of the nature herein
involved, or if the charter does not empower the corporation to make
such gifts, ratification by the stockholders may mean nothing?' Or,
as was said in one case:
"It is a universal rule that neither the board of directors nor the
majority stockholders can, over the protest of a minority stockholder,
give away corporate property!'
Even if all the stockholders do approve such an action, there
remain the rights of creditors who are entitled not to have their claims
jeopardized by the corporation's giving away of its assets.'
CHALLENGE OF THE PAYMENT BY RECIPIENT
The right of the recipient of a payment from a corporation to
maintain that the payment constitutes a gift is questionable. If the
payment were in reality a gift, he, having taken it, has participated
in an incompetent and invalid act and thus could not come into court
with the necessary clean hands. For the recipient of a payment to
contend that the payment is a gift and exempt from tax is tantamount
to saying that although he unlawfully received the payment and main-
tains a right to keep it, he seeks a declaration by the court that his
ill-gotten gain is a gift and thus exempt from the tax. He wants, and
he keeps, the ill-gotten gain; but he wants it tax-free.
Under corporate law, the recipient's participation in such an
unlawful act would necessitate his repayment of the amount received
20 Adams v. Smith, 275 Ala. 142, 145, 153 So. 2d 221, 223 (1963).
27 Rogers v. Hill, supra note 25; United Community Services v. Omaha Nat'l Bank,
162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956); Sayre Land Co. v. Borough of Sayre, supra note 21;
Gottlieb v. McKee, .34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (1954); Kerbs v. California E.
Airways, supra note 24; Western Indus. v. Vilter Mfg. Co., 257 Wis. 268, 43 N.W.2d 430
(1950); McDonough Corp. v. Connolly, 313 Mass. 62, 46 N.E.2d 576 (1943); McLaughlin
v. Corcoran, 104 Mont. 590, 69 P.2d 597 (1937).
28 Adams v. Smith, supra note 26.
29
 Western Indus. v. Vilter Mfg. Co., supra note 27, quoting 3 Thompson, Corpora-
tions, 989, § 2301 (3d ed.).
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before he could remove his obligation to pay taxes on it. But as long
as he holds the payment under a claim of right, it is quite inconsistent
for him to contend that the payment is a gift, for to make this conten-
tion where the corporation has no statutory or charter power to make
the gift is equivalent to saying that he received the payment unlaw-
fully.
CORPORATE POWERS: THE MODERN TREND
Though error has led to considerable confusion in the treatment
of alleged gifts for income tax purposes, there is also a positive point
of view. Unless the corporation has statutory authority or charter
power to make the alleged gift, we should begin with a presumption
that the payment by the corporation is one made as properly within the
corporate power, and not a gift. The leading tax decision supporting
this view is Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc. v. Commissioner, where
the Tax Court said:
It must be presumed that the petitioner's board of directors
in authorizing Sheeran's salary increase and the payments to
Sheeran's widow was acting validly and reasonably; neither
Sheeran nor his widow was a stockholder of petitioner, and
the rule of close scrutiny of transactions involving stock-
holder-officers is not applicable here. 3° (Emphasis supplied.)
For example, if the recipient is an officer or employee and not a
stockholder, the payment ordinarily will be presumed to be for services,
taxable to him as such but deductible by the corporation to the extent
that it constitutes reasonable compensation when considered along
with other compensation paid to the recipient. In case the officer or
employee is a stockholder, the amount received by him may be law-
fully paid to him as a dividend, unless he is a dominant stockholder
or a director and obtains it under circumstances that disregard the
rights of others.
Note that if the charter powers had been in evidence before the
Tax Court in another important case, Schner-Block Co., Inc. v. Com-
missioner,' and if it had been shown that the corporation had not been
granted any power to make a gift or gratuity, the court may have felt
compelled to adopt the views advanced in this paper. Rather, in deny-
3° 31 T.C. 1080, 1093 (1959). In fact, in the first case decided by the United States
Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court of the United States) the Board, in Appeal
of John H. Parrott, supra note 14, at 4, stated: "Corporate action is presumed regular
until shown to be otherwise. The payment of a bonus would be regular, the making of a
gift would be irregular."
31
 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 796 (1963). See Rubber Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 567 (1963) for a similar' view.
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ing a deduction to the corporation, the court in Schner-Block pointed
out that the corporation
[H]as not borne the burden of showing that this was not
either a "gratuity" from the shareholders to the widow or a
distribution by petitioner which, with the consent of all the
shareholders, she was enabled to receive. In neither case
would it be deductible by petitioner.
Hence, as evidenced by the decision in this case, the failure to show
the charter powers may work against the corporation, particularly
in cases where the payment is to a non-stockholder who is an officer
or employee. It may, however, also do so where the payment is to
the widow of a deceased officer or employee." Certainly, the intro-
duction of the charter powers into evidence would preclude the ap-
plication of any theory that "gift" and "compensation" may,overIap."
In the opinion of this writer, the true rationale in cases such as
Noel v. Parrott, 34
 Old Colony Trust Co.,' and others holding the
officer or employee taxable, has been based upon an effort to presume,
even in the absence of evidence of the charter powers, that the payment
was lawfully made by the corporation, and that being so, it was not
a gift but taxable compensation to the recipient. Moreover, since pay-
ment of a dividend is within the corporate power, the same rationale
appears to be applicable to those cases in which payments ostensibly
made as compensation were held to be dividends to officer-stock-
holders or employee-stockholders.
Where the charter powers of a corporation are in evidence, they
should be construed in light of the modern conditions which give a
business corporation greater powers. These are not greater powers to
make gifts; instead, they are powers to take all action reasonably
deemed necessary in the promotion of the corporation's business
purpose.
In view of changing business policies and methods, a court
should not perfunctorily substitute its business judgment for that
of the corporate officials. If the payments have been properly author-
ized, particularly if approved by the stockholders, there should be a
presumption that the payment was made for an authorized business
purpose. This was recognized by a Delaware court when, in consider-
ing the right of directors to purchase corporate stock at less than the
market price, it said:
32 See Harry L. Davis Co. v. Commissioner, 20 Cal Tax CL Mem. 1043 (1961).
88 This theory was expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Bogardus v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 44 (1937). See Peters v. Smith, 221 F.2cl 721 (3d Cir.
1955), in which reference was also made to the theory of overlapping.
84 See supra note 18.
85 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
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Where the directors have represented both themselves and
the corporation, and where there was no ratification by stock-
holders, and the action is thereupon duly challenged, the
court will usually have no choice but to employ its own judg-
ment in deciding the perhaps very close and troublesome
questions. . . . Where there was stockholder ratification,
however, the court will look into the transaction only far
enough to see whether the terms are so unequal as to amount
to waste, or whether, on the other hand, the question is such
a close one as to call for the exercise of what is commonly
called "business judgment."
In the former case the court will reverse the decision of the stock-
holders; in the latter it will not."
In short, though the court cautiously pointed out the difficulty
where directors vote themselves a benefit, it leaned heavily toward a
presumption that stockholder approval connotes lawful and business-
like action by the directors.
EFFECT OF VOID GIFT
A. No Deduction by Corporation
The author recognizes that a business corporation may actually
perform an act of giving away assets, despite a lack of power to do so.
If such action is taken, however, clearly the corporation has not
incurred an ordinary and necessary business expense deductible in
computing its taxable income, for a transfer of assets does not consti-
tute an ordinary and necessary business expense where it is outside
the power of the corporation and no reasonably adequate considera-
tion is received. Thus, the rule respecting deductibility by the cor-
poration is the same, whether the gift is within or without the powers
of the corporation.
B. No Exemption to Recipient
An alleged gift which is illegal, void, or ultra vires is not neces-
sarily exempt from a tax in the hands of the recipient. True, by state
statute an ultra vires conveyance of property may not be invalid as
such, but a stockholder may proceed against the corporation and the
corporation against the officers who make the conveyance. In exempt-
ing gifts from tax, Congress presumably did not mean to exempt gifts
made under such circumstances, but intended only to exempt true gifts
made by persons who are competent to make them and who incur no
liability in so doing. This view finds support in a decision by the
36
 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 179, 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952).
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding an individual taxable
on an illegally received and retained bonus."
WHEN GIFT IS NOT DIRECTLY BY CORPORATION
Even under the theory explained above, there may be instances
in which the corporation has not made a gift and yet the ultimate
recipient of the payment may have received one and hence is not
subject to tax. Suppose a corporate officer dies and by resolution of
the stockholders it is decided to pay his widow "a gratuity." Also
suppose sthat the dominant stockholder who owns ninety per cent of
the stock and control of the corporation is the father of the deceased
and votes in favor of the resolution. In a case such as this, it is not
beyond the realm of probability that the widow may appropriately
maintain that she received a gift. In doing so, she should, however,
not contend that the corporation made a gift to her. Instead, her argu-
ment may be that the dominant stockholder, her father-in-law, re-
ceived a constructive dividend and that he in turn made the gift to her.
Though the point has apparently not been litigated under circum-
stances such as these, it may merit consideration in view of the
holdings that a dividend need not be formally declared as such, that
it need not be distributed pro rata, and that it need not be so char-
acterized."
CONFLICT OF INTEREST CASES
Special consideration may appropriately be given to the true
nature of the transaction where the recipient of the alleged gift casts
the deciding vote as a director or as the dothinant stockholder. This
type of case may be more prevalent in close corporations or in cor-
porations where there are more than one class of stock with voting
rights limited to one class, in which a dominant stockholder or group
of stockholders cast the deciding votes.
Respecting the relationship of a director to the corporation, it is
well settled that directors and other officers, "while not trustees in the
technical sense in which that term is used, occupy a fiduciary relation
to the corporation and to the stockholders as a body."" Decisions in
many states may be cited as authority for this proposition. The leading
case, however, is Pepper v. Litton,4° in which the Supreme Court dis-
37 National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938).
88 See Barbourville Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 7, 13 (1961) and cases
cited therein; Appeal of the Pompeian Mfg. Co., 1 B.T.A. 825 (1925) ; Appeal of Reliant
Leasing Co., 1 E.T.A. 728 (1925) ; Breslin v. Fries-Breslin Co., 70 N.J.L. 274, 58 Atl.
313 (1904).
30 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 173,
	 838 (1950 ed.).
40 308 U.S. 295 (1939). See In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 625 (1940), quoting and following Pepper v. Litton ; and see Seder v.
Gibbs, 333 Mass. 445, 453, 131 N.E.2d 376, 380 (1956), which adopts a similar view and
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cussed the relationship of a dominant stockholder and a director to
his corporation. "A director is a fiduciary," the Court said, as is "a
dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders." Their
powers are powers in trust. Their dealings with the corporation are
subjected to rigorous scrutiny, and where any of their contracts or
engagements with the corporation are challenged, the burden is on the
director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the trans-
action but also to show its inherent fairness to the corporation and
other interested parties. The essence of the test is whether under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain. If it does not, a court of equity will set it aside.
All too often when this position is taken in an income tax case,
we regard it as something peculiar to the tax field, i.e., as an effort to
prevent tax avoidance. This is, however, not so. It is the law of the
land. In Pepper v. Litton, the Supreme Court was most emphatic:
He who is in such fiduciary position cannot serve him-
self first and his cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the
affairs of his corporation to their detriment and in disregard
of the standards of common decency and honesty. He cannot
by the intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient
precept against serving two masters. . . . He cannot use his
power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms
that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to
satisfy technical requirements.' (Emphasis supplied.)
In Barbourville Brick Co. v. Commissioner," there was a multiple
conflict of interest. The recipient of the payment was the widow of a
deceased officer of the corporation. She not only cast the deciding vote
in favor of the alleged gift but, as administratrix of the estate of her
deceased husband and as guardian of each of her two sons, she voted
against the interests of the estate and of her children. Out of 180
shares of corporate stock, she owned only 32, and her father-in-law,
who voted with her, owned 12. Thus, her father-in-law with his 12
shares was the only one who could, perhaps, claim that he had no
conflict of interest. Under these circumstances there was no valid
vote to pay the widow anything. It was therefore correct to hold, as
the Tax Court did, that the corporation was not entitled to a deduc-
tion. In so doing, however, the court gave a specious reason, namely,
that the payment to the widow constituted a dividend. The deduction
states as to the directors' relationship to the corporation: "They cannot be permitted to
serve two masters whose interests are antagonistic."
41 Pepper v. Litton, supra note 40, at 311.
42 See supra note 38.
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would have been more appropriately denied on the ground that the
payment was not made pursuant to any valid resolution, that it was
made in violation of the rule stated in Pepper v. Litton, and that
hence it was not an ordinary and necessary business expense.
BONUSES TO OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES
A. Early History
The early administrative position taken under the Act of 1913
leaned toward the disallowance of a corporate deduction for bonuses
paid to employees." Special payments made by a corporation, even
if allegedly made as extra compensation to certain employees, were
said to be deductible by the corporation only if two requirements
were met: (1) that it was clearly shown that the payments were made
as compensation for services rendered; and (2) that they were paid
in pursuance of a contract expressed or implied. It seemed to have
been assumed that a business corporation may make a gratuity. The
payment was said to be taxable to the recipient if it was made as
compensation for services.
Later, under the 1916 Act, the published administrative position
was that special payments, sometimes denominated gifts or bonuses,
were a part of the compensation of the employee for services rendered,
the amount of which was deductible by the corporation and taxable
to the recipient. A similar position was taken respecting such payments
when made to officers. 44 But it was also recognized that the payments
may be in the nature ,of dividends or distributions of profits, if made
to officers or employees who are also stockholders and if such pay-
ments are based upon or bear a close relation to the stockholdings of
the recipients. In this event, the payments are taxable to the recipients
but not deductible by the corporation. This position is still true today."
Except under the Act of 1913, the regulations have tested the
deductibility by reference to the reasonableness of the amount as
compensation for services rendered. Thus, from the beginning, this
test of deductibility was anticipated, though it was not expressly
included in the taxing statute until the enactment of the Revenue
Act of 1918. 46
43 T.D. 2152, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 95 (1915).
44 T.D. 2616, 19 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 405 (1917).
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-9 (1958). Although the regulations under the 1918 and 1921
Acts spoke of the possibility that certain donations to employees and others might be
considered gratuities and therefore not deductible by the corporation, they should be
construed as being particularly applicable to individuals and partnerships who are
competent to make gifts. Hence, it is not to be inferred that these regulations were
promulgated on the assumption that a business corporation has a general power to make
gifts.
40 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18 § 214(a) (1), 40 Stat. 1066 (1918) ; ch. 18 § 234(a) (1),
40 Stat. 1077 (1918).
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B. Reasonableness of Bonus
The main thrust of the test of reasonableness may be felt, not
so much in the case of a voluntary payment to an employee as such,
who is not a stockholder, but especially in the case of an officer or
employee who is also a stockholder. In the latter instance, ordinarily
the main object is to determine whether the payment constitutes com-
pensation for services rendered or is rather a distribution of a divi-
dend. Though ostensibly paid as compensation for services rendered,
if the payments correspond or bear a close relationship to the stock-
holdings, they may in reality be dividend distributions, for, as ex-
plained above, a dividend need not always be distributed pro rata.
Though the payment is made to only one stockholder, and though
the stockholder is an officer or employee, nevertheless there are cir-
cumstances in which it may be a dividend, taxable as such to the
recipient, and not deductible by the corporation in computing taxable
income.
What is more, it is implicit in the previous discussion of a con-
flict of interest that if a dominant stockholder votes himself excessive
compensation, he is taxable on it, not solely because the payment
may constitute a dividend, but perhaps more i because it is a misap-
propriation of corporate assets. Conceivably such stockholder may
also be taxable, though the payment is made to another employee
such as one who happens to be a close relative of the dominant
stockholder.
The issue of the proper classification of such a payment—as
compensation deductible by the corporation, as a dividend, or as a
misappropriation of corporate funds—is one that arises mainly in
the case of a closely controlled corporation. The rule holds that the
amount is taxable to the recipient, but is deductible by the corpora-
tion only if it constitutes reasonable compensation for services ren-
dered. If there is a misappropriation for the benefit of a relative or
other beneficiary of a dominant stockholder, the primary question
may be to determine the true recipient, that is, whether the dominant
stockholder constructively received the amount misappropriated by
his action.
C. When Deductible
Where a bonus is voted "for past services" and the corporation
reports on the accrual basis, the reasonableness of the bonus as com-
pensation is determined not solely by reference to the services rendered
within the taxable year in which the bonus is voted. 47 If the bonus is
47 Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930) is the leading case on this
point. Prior to the decision in that case, it was held in some cases that the bonus
authorized and paid as additional compensation for prior years was not deductible in
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paid in a lump-sum within the year in which it is authorized, it may
be deducted by the corporation for the year in which it is authorized.
But if payment is deferred over two or more years, it may be deducted
only as and when paid, though the corporation has adopted the accrual
method of accounting for income tax ptrposes. This result is expressly
required by statute."
PAYMENTS TO WIDOWS
A. Regulations
The income tax problem respecting payments to the widow of a
deceased corporate officer or employee goes back to the beginning of
our present federal income tax system in 1913. That this is so is evi-
denced by a Treasury Decision promulgated December 14, 1914:
Where the monthly salary of an officer or employee is
paid for a limited period after his death to his widow in
recognition of the services rendered by the husband, no ser-
vices being rendered by the widow, it is held that such pay-
ment is a gratuity and exempt from taxation under the
income tax law. Such a payment would not, however, be an
allowable deduction as an expense of carrying on business
in the return of the person, firm or corporation paying
same." (Emphasis supplied.)
This position was apparently maintained until regulations were
issued under the Act of 1918. However, beginning with those regula-
tions and continuing up to and including the regulations under the
1939 Code, the deduction was allowed. On the other hand, the regula-
tions were silent on the question of whether the amount paid to the
widow constituted income.
B. Rulings
In 1921, a ruling" was issued stating that where a corporation
pays to the widow of a deceased officer a certain amount equal to the
salary be would have earned in two months, the payment being without
consideration and constituting a gratuity voted as a compliment to the
deceased, the payment does not constitute taxable income.
This ruling, when read in conjunction with the regulations in
the year so authorized and paid. In other cases, it was held that additional compensation
for a prior year was not deductible in any year, if authorized after the close of the
prior year for which it was authorized.
48 Int. Rev. Code, § 404(b) requires that deferring the receipt of compensation shall
be treated as a plan deferring the receipt of compensation which by § 404(a) is deductible
only in the taxable year when paid.
49 T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259 (1914).
49 O.D. 1017, 5 Cum. Bull. 101 (1921).
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effect at that time, put the Service in the position of saying on the
one hand that the payment is a gift and not taxable to the widow, and,
on the other hand, that it is deductible from gross income by the
corporation. This ruling was outstanding for twenty-nine years before
it was revoked in 1950 by a ruling that payments made by an em-
ployer to the widow of a deceased officer or employee in consideration
of services rendered by such officer or employee, are inducible in the
gross income of the widow. However, as a practical matter, due to a
later announcement," this ruling did not become generally effective
until the enactment of the 1954 Code.
C. Present Position
Today, the official position is a complete reversal of the one
assumed in 1914. The earlier attitude was not to tax the widow and
not to allow the corporation a deduction. Then, for a time, the position
was to allow the corporation a deduction, but not to tax the widow.
Now, the official position of the Internal Revenue Service is that
payments to " 'widows' generally are not gifts.'
One theory in support of this position is its Congressional en-
dorsement, in substance, when the 1954 Code specifically provided
that the widow of a deceased employee may exclude up to $5,000 of
the amount paid to her by her deceased husband's employer." This
section would have been unnecessary were the payment a gift.
D. Judicial View
Since the Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v. Duber-
stein," the Tax Court has held that voluntary payments to a widow
of a deceased employee are not gifts." Some federal courts agree;"
other courts do not. 58
51 I.T. 4027, 1950-2 Cum. Bull. 9.
52 See Rev. Rul. 58-613, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 914, in which the Internal Revenue
Service announced that it would no longer litigate such cases involving widows which
arose under the 1939 Code.
53
 Rev, Rul. 62-102, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 37, modifying Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2
Cum. Bull. 32.
54 Int. Rev. Code, § 101(b).
55 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
56 Penick v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 999 (1962) ; Westphal v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.
340 (1961). In accord are several Tax Court memorandum opinions.
57 See Carson v. United States, 317 F.2d 370 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Gaugler v. Com-
missioner, 312 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Smith v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.
1962); Martin v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1962); Froehlinger v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 13 (D. Md. 1963); Hein v. United States, 205 F. Supp. 365 (E.D.
Wis. 1962).
56 Olsen v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Frankel,
302 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1962); Poyner v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1962);
Kuntz v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kasynski, 284
F.2d 143 (10th Cir. 1960).
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Fundamentally, it may be that all of these cases proceed upon
the same basis, namely, that the issue is one of fact and the object
is to discover the dominant motive for the payment to the widow. In
ascertaining the motive, the court may look to one or more of the
following factors: (1) the payments are made to the widow of the
deceased employee and not to his estate; (2) there is no obligation
on the part of the corporation to pay any additional compensation
to the deceased employee; (3) the corporation derives no benefit from
the payment; (4) the widow performed no services for the corpora-
tion; (5) the services of the husband had been fully compensated;
(6) the widow is in good financial condition; (7) her health is good
or poor, as the case may be.
Resort to these and other similar tests generally occurs where
there is no evidence that the corporation lacks statutory authority or
charter power to make a gift. Even so, the tests are rather superficial.
Whether the payment is made to the widow or to the estate of the
deceased employee is wholly immaterial if the widow is the sole bene-
ficiary, the sole residuary legatee under the deceased's will, or if, as
has been held in at least one case," the payment cannot be a part of
the deceased employee's estate since no contract existed under which
payment could have been enforced. In this latter example, since the
payment was authorized after the death of the husband, the estate
never became entitled to it, and the executor has no authority to make
distribution of it. Under these circumstances, the fact that payment
is made to the widow appears to fall far short of rebutting the sensible
presumption that the payment is for services rendered by her husband.
It also is quite unrealistic to test the nature of the payment by the
fact that the corporation was under no expressed or implied obligation
to make the payment. Many corporate payments for good business
reasons are made voluntarily. Nor does it follow that the payment is a
gift, even if a payment is voluntarily made for no discernible business
reason. It cannot be a gift if the corporation has no power to make one.
It may be a misappropriation of corporate funds, or, if the recipient
is a stockholder, it may be a dividend.
Moreover, even if the payment is not a dividend or a misappro-
priation of corporate funds, to say that the corporation derived no
benefit from it is to substitute the opinion of the court for the sound
judgment of the responsible corporate officials or of the stockholders,
without there being convincing proof that their judgment is not sound.
The same observation may also be made respecting a court's conclu-
sion that the services of the deceased husband have been fully com-
pensated.
59 Wanner v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1936).
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What is even more vulnerable is that the tests proceed not from a
presumption that the corporation acted properly, but upon the basis
that the burden of proof is upon the party who denies that the pay-
ment is a gift. Admittedly, if. the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
determines that a corporation has made a gift that is not deductible
by the corporation, his determination is prima facie correct. In such
case, the corporation has the burden of producing sufficient evidence
to warrant a finding of error in the Commissioner's determination.
This is to say that the corporation should at least produce its charter
to show that it has no power to make a gift. On the other hand, if the
Commissioner has determined that the payment is income to the widow
of a deceased officer or employee but she claims that it is a gift, the
widow really has no basis for probative evidence that the payment
is a gift unless she first shows that the corporation has charter power
or statutory authority to make a gift.
There is no question in the mind of this writer that the decisions
holding that there is a gift to the widow may reflect some effort to
follow the Supreme Court decision in Stanton v. United States.". In the
Stanton case, the payment was by a wholly owned subsidiary of a
church to a retiring officer of the subsidiary. The subsidiary was
apparently not an ordinary business corporation. It could have been
an instrumentality or agency' of the church. Perhaps it was. Be that
as it may, there was no showing that it lacked the authority or the
power to make a gift. In short, there was no evidence squarely con-
tradicting the alleged intention to make a gift. Thus, the case did not
involve the competency or the power of an ordinary business corpora-
tion to make a gift.
On the other hand, it may be true that, in cases involving pay-
ments to widows, the Supreme Court decision in Bogardus v. Commis-
sioner" has exerted a stronger influence than has the Stanton case. In
Bogardus, payments were made by corporation B to Bogardus and
others who had been employees of corporation A, all of whose stock
and assets had been taken over by corporation B.
Here again the record apparently did not contain any evidence
that corporation B had no power to make gifts. What is more, by
66 363 U.S, 281. The companion case was Duberstein v. Commissioner, supra note 55.
61 A number of decisions emphasize that ownership alone of stock in one corporation
by another does not create an identity of corporate interest between the companies or
create the relation of principal and agent or representative between the two. See, for
example, Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918). This
rule is not controlling where the parent corporation does not participate in the normal
and usual manner as a stockholder. However, as stated in the leading case, NLRB v.
Denna Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402..403 (1960), quoting Berky v. Third Ave. Ry.,
244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), dominion may be so complete that by the
general rules of agency the parent is a principal and the subsidiary an agent.
62 See supra note 33.
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stipulation of the parties, the payments were not made or intended to
be made for any services rendered or to be rendered or for any con-
sideration given or to be given by any of the recipients or to the
corporate stockholders of the corporation making the payments. Thus,
the stipulation clearly contradicted any reasonable presumption that
the payments were made for services rendered or for any other con-
sideration.
In view of this artificial record, it is not surprising that the
payments were held not to be taxable to the recipient. Nor is it sur-
prising to see different courts refer to the Bogardus case as a basis
for reaching different results in different cases. They seemingly start
with the hypothesis that a business corporation has the power to make
gifts, which may be a sound, cautious hypothesis when there is no
evidence to contradict it. Thus, whether the payment is made to the
widow of a deceased officer or employee or to a stranger, the nub of
the confusion is in a failure to show no statutory authority and no
charter power for the corporation to make a gift.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In his book Crossroads: 1913,63 Paul M. Angle concludes that
the year 1913 marked the end of a Golden Age and the beginning of
a New Era. In a sense this may be true. Significantly, however, the
book was written fifty years later when the author could look back
and reasonably appraise the events of 1913. To see what has been done
and to adjust ourselves accordingly takes time. This is particularly
true in the law, for in the law stability is important. It is also im-
portant, because, as in the taxation of corporate bonuses, there
may be a period of uncertainty respecting the decisive facts.
It was therefore quite a sound step forward when in 1926, without
mentioning any lack of corporate power to make a gift, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and held
in Noel v. Parrott" that a corporate payment to an officer was not a
gift but constituted compensation for services. This conclusion was
reached, notwithstanding the fact that the payment was made pursuant
to a resolution that "a gratuitous appropriation . . . be set aside .. .
for distribution to certain officers and employees of the company!"68
(Emphasis in original.)
In 1929, in the Old Colony Trust Co. case," the Supreme Court
made it even more certain that as a general rule bonus payments to
officers or employees constitute compensation for services taxable to
63 Angle, Crossroads: 1913 (1953).
04 See supra note 16.
65 Ibid.
66 See supra note 35.
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the recipient. Moreover, the practical application of this rule was
enhanced in 1930 when, in the .Ox Fibre Brush Co. case," the Supreme
Court held that the payments may be deducted by the corporation
though they are for services rendered in prior years.
On the other hand, if the payment is really a dividend distribu-
tion made in the guise of a compensatory bonus, it does not come
within this general rule." In such case, the dividend is taxable, but
no deduction is allowable to the corporation. There may, of course,
be no valid dividend if a dominant stockholder authorizes payment
to himself and not to all other holders of the stock; or if the directors
alone authorize payment to themselves and not to other stockholders;
or if the recipient authorizes the payment by voting his own stock and
other stock which he holds in a fiduciary capacity. Even if the dividend
is found to be invalid, however, it may be taxed to the recipient where
he holds it under a claim of right. In other words, no dividend, valid
or invalid, may be deducted as an ordinary and necessary expense of
the corporation.
The general rule applied to bonuses paid to corporate officers or
employees should be applied to a bonus payment made by a corpora-
tion to the widow of a deceased officer or employee. Whether the pay-
ment is a gift, or is compensation, depends upon the generally accepted
meaning of "gift," rather than upon particular state law. In the usual
case, it is inconceivable that such payment would be made to the
widow were the deceased never employed by the corporation. In short,
the only sensible reason for the payment is that it is additional com-
pensation for services rendered by the deceased husband. On the other
hand, if the widow alone authorizes payment to herself by voting
stock she owns or stock which she holds in a fiduciary capacity, the
payment, though taxable to her, may not be deductible by the cor-
poration. Conceivably, however, the payment may be a gift to her
if it is in substance a constructive dividend to a dominant stockholder
or group of stockholders.
In the opinion of the writer, this is the direction in which the law
of income taxation relative to corporate bonuses is moving. If it is not
—if confusion continues—uncertainty may spread, but not to disturb
presently recognized rights of minority stockholders and of creditors,
67 See supra note 47.
68 It may, however, pose nevPissues for established corporation law. To illustrate,
suppose that, in authorizing payment of a bonus, the corporate directors adopt an inept
resolution which deprives the corporation of its right to deduct the payment and causes
it to pay additional income tax. Do they personally incur a liability for the amount of
the additional tax? See In re Inman's Estate, 22 Misc. 2d 573, 196 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1959), in
which the executors elected to deduct certain expenses for income tax purposes rather
than deduct them in computing the estate tax. The court directed that the estate be
reimbursed by the amount of the additional estate tax incurred by reason of this election.
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and not to mollify liabilities of those who improperly authorize the
payment of alleged bonuses. In so far as corporation law or the Iaw of.
gifts is related to the income tax problems here discussed, it is well
settled; our problem is to apply its principles correctly in determining
the facts of legal import in income taxation.
Thus, here is a subject in which the mystery of income tax law
is in the selection of the facts of legal import. This being so, we should
perhaps give greater weight to the words of the legendary practical
judge. "Let me find the facts," said he, "and I don't care who writes
the opinion of the court."
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